While analyzing security of iMiniCam app, I learned some part of UDP protocol used to communicate with the camera. Here is quick bunch of facts.

UDP layer

Port 32100 (Proto_Hello, to external server) and port 32108 (others, to camera).

Type-length layer

Following structure represents first header that is always found in datagram.

struct header {
  uint8_t magic;
  enum proto_type type;
  uint16_t length;
}

In this structure magic is always set to 0xf1, type is one of the below values, packed on single byte and length count data that follows this packet, so if it is equal to zero, only those four bytes are transmitted. Continue reading “PPPP API: what I know” →

Lately, I bought some random, noname spy camera from usual Chinese sources. Just after unboxing, one detail seemed a bit suspicious to me: together with the camera there comes a link to Android app, that is meant to control the camera. What is worse, the link leads to some Chinese app shop, obviously with only one language available (notice the version – 1.0.33, as it is not the only one in the wild):

http://m.app.so.com/detail/index?pname=com.hbwy.fan.iminicams&id=3646142

As I’ve already seen apps that i.e. calls home, despite having no need to open a single socket and then sending data like IMEI, IMSI, MAC addresses and so on, red lamp turned on and I said to myself: stop. Let’s reverse engineer the thing first!

OSINT

Before I begun my reverse engineering, I attempted to ask uncle Google (and his friends 🙂 ) to gain some knowledge. Usual virustotal gives me this:

Virustotal results for com.hbwy.fan.iminicams — Results of virustotal scan of original link

Continue reading “Security analysis of spy camera sold by Chinese suppliers: iMiniCam app” →